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$40 per pound

The price of delay is set to $40 per pound, did you realise that? Because in the mind of some, you do not go to war over $80-$800, you give a fine, but what happens when we realise that the mentioned $800 is 10 Kg of enriched Uranium? Then how do we react?

That is the harsh reality that Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister is playing. Not only is the headline insincere and optionally an outright lie, the notion of ‘Iran says it will never build a nuclear weapon‘, is the dream response of any politician siding with the acts of the ostrich and the possum. Playing dead or putting your head in the sand is now the most dangerous of all actions. Even if there is optionally some truth in ‘Islam prevented the country from doing so‘ (no judgment here) there is enough reasonable intelligence that the amount of enriched Uranium in Iran has now surpassed 180 Kg, and that is merely from the sources that can be traced, I feel certain that there are 1-3 sources that remain hidden and there is no way to tell how much there is in these locations, but it is safe to set that amount to at least 2Kg per site, implying that Iran has surpassed the 93% marker. Iran needs time; this is the one moment where they are actually vulnerable. The moment that the first dirty bomb is ready, that is the moment that the window has closed and the countdown begins for some high ranking Iranian officer to do something really stupid as he becomes a self-designed ‘martyr’, at that point it is too late for all of us. At that point Saudi Arabia and Israel have no options left but to wage open war, leaving the UAE, Qatar and Oman in the middle of that mess.

No one wants it, but the politicians are giving us little choice soon enough. The actions against Iran have failed to the larger degree. Even the Guardian (at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/25/iran-says-us-sanctions-on-supreme-leader-means-permanent-closure-of-diplomacy) is set to some level of denial (or contemplated avoidance) with “Iran has said it will breach the uranium enrichment limits set out in the 2015 nuclear deal on Thursday, but that does not imply the country is on the path to building a nuclear weapon

USA GE (or is that usage?)

So what else can this be used for. That is an important question because even as it is essential for a nuclear weapon, it is not the only use. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) can be used in civil reactors. Yet the danger is not merely that, when it is used and called spend fuel, it can still be used for bombs. In the past we ignored it because handling is critically dangerous on the person handling it. Yet with suicide bombers that danger is negated as they blow themselves and half a city to rubble. The issue is that HEU is not essential for power creation making a lot of the conversation moot. The alternative usage is Medical Isotopes (one Kg would suffice for decades) and as a fuel source for icebreakers (loads of those in Iran) and space propulsion (in light of the current Iranian space program it seems the most feasible one), so as…., oh darn it, Iran doesn’t have an actual space program. Well they do, they were actually one of the earlier players 15 years ago, alas as its budget for the Iranian Space Agency has been lowered to below $5 million, we can assume that they are saving up to launch one in 10 years, so now the USA General Electric reference. In May 2018 we got “General Electric Co. is planning to end sales of oil and natural-gas equipment later this year in Iran, people familiar with the matter said, illustrating how U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal is shutting a narrow window of opportunity for some American businesses there” (source: GE), Yet when I searched deeper, I found references (references, not evidence) that there are links between Enrichment Technology Company (ETC, Enritec), towards Areva (source: Le Monde) and when we see the desperate need of €7,000,000,000 there is an opening, and as such, as I found “With a view to cooperation in the field of uranium centrifuge enrichment, AREVA signed an agreement on November 24, 2003 with Urenco and its shareholders under which AREVA will buy 50% of the share capital of Enrichment Technology Company Ltd (ETC), which combines Urenco’s activities in the design and construction of equipment and facilities for uranium centrifuge enrichment, as well as related research and development. The acquisition was submitted to the European anti-trust authorities, which gave their official approval on October 6, 2004. The quadripartite treaty among Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France was ratified on July 3, 2006, allowing this agreement to be implemented“, I found what might be regarded as a staged setting, not anything tangible. As we get to the stage of Espionage we get: “In the 1970s, Pakistani Abdul Qadir Khan spied on the Urenco office in Almelo. Thanks to the knowledge that Khan obtained from Urenco, among others, an enrichment plant for uranium in Kahuta (Pakistan) has been replicated using Urenco’s ultracentrifuge technology. This knowledge has also been disseminated via Khan to Iran, Libya, and North Korea“, I personally believe that this was also shared with Iran (at some point), giving them what they need to achieve their goal. It was not done in the 70’s, yet the shifting of funds gave rise that there was a purchase around 2011, yet not merely goods (this is highly speculative), information was optionally bought as well, so even as there is no direct proof, there is the implied stage where under Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad all the knowledge that Iran needed was available. There are also links to a firm called Nuovo Pignon (Florence), yet to what extent was not clear and there was but one small reference towards “The other shareholders of Eurodif SA are Synatom of Belgium, Enea of Italy, Enusa of Spain, and Sofi dif, a company owned by French and Iranian interests. AREVA NC has a 60% stake in Sofi dif” which we see from 2007 to 2012, so the timeline still fits, in addition to that, when I look at the ‘Report And Recommendations Of The Nevada Commission On Nuclear Projects‘ at [nv1012comm] we see the players like Areva, Synatom as well as Arjun Makhijani, whose name makes perfect sense, yet from page 52 onwards, in his paper ‘The mythology and messy reality of nuclear fuel reprocessing‘, we see the mention of the PUREX process, yet at this point, the fact that Iran has chosen this process 14 years ago is missing completely from the report which is now regarded as odd. This is not some classification issue, it is an intentional omission. We might consider part of this as in page 29: “The Iranian example of building a large gas centrifuge plant secretly provides an example of what could happen in the plutonium arena once the size of reprocessing plants is greatly reduced“, This report from 2010 surpasses the fact that the PUREX process was already in place for 6 years, and it now gives the added speculative option that Iran has already surpassed the 200Kg limit, implied is not proven we accept that, yet when we consider the ‘weight’ of the Nevada Commission on Nuclear Projects and that information is missing or disregarded (optionally reclassified) gives rise that the pressures in Iran are a lot larger, and that problem will not go away by sticking your head in the oil enriched sand, or playing possum.

 

Now, the next part is highly speculative, so feel free to reject or ignore it.

I believe that the Natanz Uranium enrichment complex south of Tehran was the ruse. It did everything it needed to there, but there was at least another place (still speculative) where enrichment was set to surpass at least 60%, I remember the article (at https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/iran-activate-thousands-uranium-enrichment-centrifuges-ahmadinejad-says/) well, yet I was misguided that this was an ego boost for pride, I never considered then that it was misdirection to not look at another place.

Could I be wrong?

Absolutely!

I very much doubt my own views in this, yet the play by Javad Zarif gives rise to the stage that things are not that simple and that their twist to buy time might not be on the up and up and can we afford that mistake knowing what is at stake?

That is part of the problem in all this, we must recognise that America lost credibility for the longest of time (The US and the case of the Silver briefcase), Those who blindly followed it are in not a much better stage and for the longest time, especially in light of the proxy war, the word of Iran cannot be taken as evidence or blindly be trusted. These are all elements influencing the current stage and as the center of attention is Highly Enriched Uranium, the stakes are very much too high.

So when we see: ‘Iran says it will never build a nuclear weapon‘, we have to go with the premise that this is exactly what they are willing to do, even if it means handing of the result to a player like Hezbollah, it makes for a much more dangerous setting that has no resolve but go boom at some stage, and no one can afford to wait for that.

All this comes to the larger orchestral finale when we consider Haaretz (at https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/iran-and-trump-in-nuclear-standoff-what-s-next-for-the-nuclear-deal-1.7406005), where we see: “Iran announced in mid-June that by the 27th of the month it will exceed the uranium stockpile limit set by Tehran’s nuclear deal with world powers, pushing tensions with the U.S. into uncharted and potentially dangerous territory“, so as they claim to reach the maximum tomorrow, I see enough speculative evidence that they already surpassed it by a fair bit, the problem is not on how to act and react, but in this (personal speculated) view (a speculative amount of) 5-35Kg is unaccounted for and there is no guarantee that Iran did not give it to Houthi and/or Hezbollah forces making matters worse by a lot. In all this Russian Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergei Ryabkov is making matters worse through “Russia and its partners will take steps to counter new sanctions that Washington has said it will impose on Iran“, this stand off for time is what Iran wants, so that they can point at their proxy players when something goes boom and these parties should at that point all be held to account, the problem is that the only way of doing that is to start a war no one wants. The Middle East escalation strategy is in full effect and until we deal with Iran we cannot diffuse the situation, and the fallout of that situation will haunt everyone for decades if it comes to blows. I expect the economy would not survive such a blow.

It is merely my view and optionally all very incorrect, yet the pieces are there for everyone to see.

 

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Something for the Silver Screen?

There is an issue in Europe, well, there are plenty of issues in Europe, but until now, I steered clear of one of them. Something does not add up and it is now more of an issue than ever before.

This trip started in the Washington Post, after I saw several articles in the Guardian. You see, with one article it has become something else and that is very much an issue. So (at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-to-respond-very-soon-to-british-decision-to-expel-its-diplomats/2018/03/15/89e27b4a-2839-11e8-b79d-f3d931db7f68_story.html), we see ‘U.S., France and Germany join Britain in saying Russia likely responsible for chemical attack against former spy‘, the mere title. Now, I am not saying that this is not what happened, not even implying that it is some figment. Yet, why would we see ‘U.S., France and Germany join Britain‘? This is a simple murder, perhaps an assassination, or liquidation. Whatever word you use for the event, it does not matter to the person who got iced, he definitely no longer cares. But we, we should care, for us this entire situation matters. So when we see in the very beginning “formally backed Britain’s claims that Russia likely was responsible for a chemical toxin attack against a former spy living in England“, I personally am not convinced. There would have been any number of actions that would have resulted in the demise of that person. To get a gun is usually not hard if you know the people. There was a person in the 90’s that one could meet near Ilford, would be able to get a whole range of guns, no silencers though. Still for £350-£500 (in those days) you could get something not too fancy and it would clean the clock of whoever needed to be done. Just make sure you do not do it in the wrong place and upset the local family guy, because that tends not to work. Still, consider the ease of a mere gun against the dangers, the risks and the trouble of getting VX into the country, than getting it to the location. You only need to see the movie ‘The Rock‘ to know that it requires several things, a lot of it dodgy and that stuff is not that stable to begin with. Now, as we see that there was a nerve agent in play, so I am not opposing that. I am merely stating that this kind of work is odd to begin with. That is beside the point of any SVR RF, FSB or GRU member freaking out having to take that shit with them. It is not merely overkill; it tends to leave you without options if you fail at first. And ask any Murphy that your shit goes wrong the first opportunity nature gets their hands on you. It is a fact of life. So in that regard it seems to me that Novichok is a weird choice to use. This is also me stating that I have no evidence that it was NOT used. So when I take a little lesson in Novichok, I learned the following:

  1. At https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/CSP/RC-3/en/rc3wp01_e_.pdf, we see “Regarding new toxic chemicals not listed in the Annex on Chemicals but which may nevertheless pose a risk to the Convention, the SAB makes reference to “Novichoks”. The name “Novichok” is used in a publication of a former Soviet scientist who reported investigating a new class of nerve agents suitable for use as binary chemical weapons. The SAB states that it has insufficient information to comment on the existence or properties of “Novichoks”” which they state on page 3 in paragraph 8. Now this is 2013 and this is 5 years later. Yet, as some sources give us that it was developed in the 70’s up to the early 90’s, it seems interesting that there was nothing on the matter 20 years later.
  2. Yet that same OPCW gave us in April 2011, two years earlier the two following parts on page 7 at 11.1 and 11.2. With: “This has been attracting increasing attention in recent years, particularly among non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Although very little information has appeared in the public domain, there have been claims that a new class of nerve agents, known as “Novichoks”, has been developed. In December 2008, a former defence scientist published a book, which included information on structures reported to be those of the new agents. Some of these structures meet the criteria for Schedule 2 B4 (S2 B4); however, all others are non-scheduled chemicals. The author claimed that the toxicity of certain “Novichok” agents may exceed that of VX“, something that should have woken up the CIA instantly, something deadlier than VX and no defence? There is no way that they wouldn’t have been chasing that, even if it was merely to find a defence against it.

So now we have the play to some extent in view. The BBC gave first view (at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-43377856) with “Former spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned by a military-grade nerve agent of a type developed by Russia“, yet it is the innuendo of News.com.au that takes the limelight. With “Investigators believe the nerve agent that poisoned former Russian agent Sergei Skripal was planted in his daughter’s suitcase before she left Moscow, The Telegraph newspaper reported, citing unidentified sources. Skripal, 66, and his daughter Yulia, 33, were found slumped unconscious on a bench outside a shopping centre in the genteel southern English city of Salisbury on March 4“, so not only did they go the whole nine yards to get to both, the entire issue is that both could have been removed simple enough in Salisbury. The entire matter does not add up. Another source, The Jamestown Foundation gives us “Sergei Skripal (66), a former Russian military intelligence (GRU) colonel, was arrested in Moscow in 2004 for allegedly being an agent of the United Kingdom’s MI6 intelligence service. Skripal was convicted, in 2006, to serve 13 years in prison for treason. In 2010, he was pardoned, released and sent to the UK in a major spy exchange involving a big group of “sleeper” spies who had been arrested in the United States, promptly convicted and deported to Russia“, so if we accept these facts, than we see that he was shipped to the UK 8 years ago. So now we see such an overkill event? It does not add up!

This level of overkill implies (mind you I am saying ‘implies’) personal orchestration, this is a message, but for who the message is for (or ‘from’ for that matter) is not clear. There is enough evidence that the toxin was used, but there is a long road here. Even as we accept the Jamestown Foundation giving us “Other officials insist Novichok was never officially defined as a chemical weapon and was not destroyed, because it never officially existed (Interfax, March 14). Mirzayanov, who is apparently the main whistle-blower on Novichok, is being actively discredited by the pro-Kremlin press (Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 15). Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov categorically denied there ever was a secret nerve agent program named “Novichok in Russia or in the USSR,” while Russia has stopped all work on developing new chemical weapons and has completed the destruction of existing stockpiles. Ryabkov referred to Mirzayanov as a “defector,” who was not trustworthy (Militarynews, March 15)“. This now gets us to the crux of the matter. The whistle-blower Vil Mirzayanov is now living in the US. Now we get to the good stuff, which is given by The Guardian, the article (at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/16/russian-spy-poisoning-attack-novichok-chemist) gives us ‘chemist says non-state actor couldn’t carry out attack‘, that is a notion I can very well agree with. In addition, as I stated earlier “the chemical was too dangerous for anyone but a “high-level senior scientist” to handle and that even he – who worked for 30 years inside the secret military installation where novichok was developed and gained extensive personal experience in handling the agent – would not know how to weaponize it“. If this stuff has been weaponised it would be a novel usage and also a very novel situation. The fact that the luggage went from Moscow without setting off any alarms, the fact that it survived the trip (you know how luggage carriers tend to be), as well as the setting that it went off at the time it did gives rise to all kinds of technological options. Still we have the setting of who would have done it. Mirzayanov supports this with ““You need a very high-qualified professional scientist,” he continued. “Because it is dangerous stuff. Extremely dangerous. You can kill yourself. First of all you have to have a very good shield, a very particular container. And after that to weaponize it – weaponize it is impossible without high technical equipment. It’s impossible to imagine.”” and let’s not forget the target, a former GRU agent who had been in prison for 4 years and then exchanged. It seems to me that it is not impossible that Russia was behind it, but I feel that the entire approach was too personal. I speculate that this was likely a Russian with a personal axe to grind, moreover this was a test-run (a mere speculation) and the person decided to go after the one person he had hatred for and in that regard going after the daughter made perfect sense, even more so as it would hurt the person he wanted to get to even more. So was this the case?

Now the last part is all speculative but it adds up, the effort shown for stuff that is still material for denial from the original whistle-blower giving us ‘would not know how to weaponize it‘, and that is from the person who actually handled the stuff. It is the very last part that also matters; with “Mirzayanov thinks the Salisbury attack was performed with a binary version of the agent brought through customs and automatically mixed at the time of the attack“, so two elements, mixing and distributing, such a device was not seen when the luggage got to the UK?

There are too many issues and even as I agree wholeheartedly on the message that Vil Mirzayanov brought to us, I am not convinced that this was some elaborate scheme from the Russian government. Sending any officer of the SVR RF, FSB, GRU or even the Voyska Spetsialnogo Naznacheniya to go shopping in London with the message “Oh, and before you fly back, would you kindly put a bullet in the back of the head of both Sergei and Yulia Skripal?“, a simple mandate avoiding well over half a dozen of cogs that could be clogged with mere sand at any given time.

That is why it does not add up. In hindsight there is one additional part. Is it true that ONLY Russia has that stuff? The entire matter when we see some papers where the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, was to some extent in the dark 5 years ago. In light of Vil Mirzayanov moving to New Jersey in 1996, so 15 years later the OPCW is still in the dark? That path makes even less sense. In addition, the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) seemed to have been equally in the dark. From those parts alone, whilst one of the handlers was in the US for the last 22 years, the entire setting is a stretch. It does make sense that the US would have been part of the conversation, yet how do France and Germany fit in? Some presented unity on standing up against Russia?

There is little question on the timeline. So when we see the BBC (at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-43297638), they are found by a doctor and nurse at 16:15, both unconscious. So they had made it to the Malting’s shopping centre (or so the information implies). So when we learn “A police officer who was the first to attend the scene is now in a serious condition in hospital, Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley said“, which we get form the article (at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-43323847) we should be able to tell more. But we cannot, the News is too chaotic, BBC, SBS and other reliable sources give us the snippets, but not an actual slice of the cake. The timeline implies that they were poisoned on the spot, the fact that Nick Bailey, a police officer who became unwell after taking part in the early response to the attack gives additional rise to the use of a toxin, but that implies that it was done there, on the spot. Even if the toxin was moved through touch, the speed at which Nick Bailey got it implies (speculative from my side) that the toxin worked fast, unless the location was less than a 4 minute walk from their house, that option would be taken away as the toxin would be pushed through the body via the bloodstream. In addition any longer would make the Novichok useless, nerve agents are that because they are close to lightning fast, even as we expect that the police officer was lucky and too little got to him.

Yet it was only a few hours ago that the Guardian is giving us a timeline (aren’t they just the best). So the article (at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/16/skripals-poisoning-what-we-know-so-far) gives us a decent timeline. I particularly liked “most likely in powder form and the means of delivery could have been as simple as a letter“, so perhaps it might be: “most likely in powder form and the means of delivery could have been as simple as the restaurant bill“, you see the hour at Zizzi as well as the fact that they were found 40 minutes later. A nerve agent will work fast, really fast so the 40 minutes would have been a stretch no matter what, yet the fact when they were found and when they were overcome is not a given, so they could have been smouldering there for over 20 minutes. It equally gives rise that the longer they were there the less impact it would have had on Constable Nick Bailey, his luck I might add. The Guardian is now showing the issues I had and that is good (for me), so as I finalise reading that article, I see a number of issues and even as I had seen most issues, the one part that they aren’t giving us (as It was not part of the timeline) was seen in the in depth of the Independent (at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/uk-russia-nerve-agent-attack-spy-poisoning-sergei-skripal-salisbury-accusations-evidence-explanation-a8258911.html). Here we see: “Some analysts have claimed that Novichoks could have been smuggled out of chemical weapons and storage sites after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when facilities were abandoned by unpaid staff and security was low“, “if the precursor ingredients were smuggled out in the 1990s, stored in proper conditions and mixed recently, they could still be deadly in a small-scale attack according to some experts” as well as “In 1995, a Russian banking magnate called Ivan Kivelidi and his secretary died from organ failure after being poisoned with a military grade toxin found on an office telephone. A closed trial found that his business partner had obtained the substance via intermediaries from an employee of a state chemical research institute known as GosNIIOKhT, which was involved in the development of Novichoks” give us a few things. In the first that the experts are kind of clueless, we might be blaming Russia on all this and it might be true, yet the latter part that involves Ivan Kivelidi takes away the ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’. The fact that this stuff is out in the open to some degree is a much larger issue and when we see “Leonard Rink, told police he had been storing poisons in his garage and selling them to pay off debts“, we see part that takes the Russian government optionally out of the equation and gives us the part I came with earlier “the entire approach was too personal. I speculate that this was likely a Russian with a personal axe to grind“, it fits the bill of the restaurant one might state, that is, if the timeline of the events and the timeline of the toxin can be proven, because both are the axial in the issue.

No matter how this plays out, this could become one hell of a movie and when we see it on the silver screen, will Matt Damon play the person with the grudge, or the scientist who initially played a role in developing it? However we should reserve the role of Skripal for John Larroquette, it will be nice to see him again on the big screen.

 

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